We value the option of subcontracting to improve Þnancial performance and system coordination by analyzing a competitive stochastic investment game with recourse. The manufacturer and subcontractor decide separately on their capacity investment levels. Then demand uncertainty is resolved and both parties have the option to subcontract when deciding on their production and sales. We analyze and present outsourcing conditions for three contract types:
Introduction
We present analytic models to study subcontracting and outsourcing, two prevalent business practices across many industries. While the word subcontracting has been used for nearly two centuries, outsourcing Þrst appeared in the English language only as recently as 1982 [2] . Both terms refer to the practice of one company (the subcontractor or supplier) providing a service or good for another (the contractor, buyer or manufacturer). Subcontracting typically refers to the situation where the contractor "procures an item or service that is normally capable of economic production in the contractor's own facilities and that requires the contractor to make speciÞcations available to the subcontractor [7] ." Outsourcing refers to the special case where the contractor has no in-house production capability and is dependent on the subcontractor for the entire product volume.
We value the option of subcontracting and outsourcing to improve Þnancial performance and system coordination by analyzing a two-stage, two-player, two-market stochastic game. In stage one, the manufacturer and subcontractor decide separately on their investment levels. Then demand uncertainty is resolved and both parties have the option to subcontract when deciding on their production levels in stage two, constrained by their earlier investment decisions. Subcontracting is viewed as a trade of the supplier's product for the manufacturer's money. Section 2 Þrst analyzes two scenarios (the centralized Þrm vs. two independent Þrms without any subcontracting) for performance reference. In Section 3 we study price-only contracts where an ex-ante transfer price is set for each unit supplied by the subcontractor. We characterize the sub-game perfect investment strategy and formulate an outsourcing threshold condition in terms of the manufacturer's investment cost. A higher transfer price may increase the manufacturer's proÞt. This suggests that a price-focused strategy for managing subcontractors can backÞre on the manufacturer. While a lower price allows cheap supply, it does not guarantee its availability. Our model conÞrms that optimal manufacturer and supplier capacity levels are imperfect substitutes with respect to capacity costs and contribution margins. We also show that manufacturers will indeed subcontract more when the level of market uncertainty (risk) increases and when markets are more negatively correlated. Similar to Þnancial options, this increases the option value of subcontracting (real assets). In Section 4 we study two other contract types. One uses the incomplete contracting approach where no explicit contracts can be made and both parties negotiate over the subcontracting transfer. This allows us to analyze the role of the "bargaining power" of the contractor on outsourcing decisions and system performance improvement, which may be greater than with price-only contracts. The latter suggests that sometimes Þrms may be better off leaving some contract parameters unspeciÞed ex-ante and agreeing to negotiate after demand is observed. Our third contract type consists of state-dependent price-only and incomplete contracts for which we show an equivalence result. While subcontracting with these three contract types can coordinate production decisions in the supply system, only state-dependent contracts can eliminate all decentralization costs and coordinate capacity investment decisions. We present the minimally sufficient price-only contract that achieves coordination. Section 5 closes with a discussion of more complex contracts in the literature and suggestions for further work.
Many literatures discuss the costs and beneÞts of subcontracting. According to the strategy literature, subcontracting and outsourcing occur because a Þrm may Þnd it less proÞtable or infeasible to have all required capabilities in house: "a Þrm should concentrate on its core competencies and strategically outsource other activities [19] " and "not one company builds an entire ßight vehicle, not even the simplest light plane, because of the exceptional range of skills and facilities required [1]". Subcontracting and outsourcing may also be "an impetus and agent for change" and "may improve unduly militant or change-resisting" employee relations [4] . These beneÞts come at a cost by exposing the contractor to strategic risks, such as dependence on the subcontractor (with its inherent loss of control and associated hold-up risk) and vulnerability (e.g., lower barriers to entry and loss of competitive edge and conÞdentiality) [19] . The operations literature highlights the ßexibility that subcontracting offers to production and capacity planning. Like demand and inventory management, subcontracting allows for short term capacity adjustments in the face of temporal demand variations. Subcontracting, however, has the distinguishing feature that it "requires agreement with a third party who may be a competing Þrm with conßicting interests [14] ." (The implication being that any reasonable model of subcontracting must incorporate multiple decision makers.) From a Þnancial perspective, the main reported beneÞts of subcontracting and outsourcing are lower operating costs and lower investment requirements for the contractor, and the spreading of risk between the two parties. Empirical studies report that cost efficiency is the prime motivation for outsourcing maintenance [4] and information systems [16] . It is also argued that contractors 'push the high risk' onto subcontractors by having them "carry a disproportionate share of market uncertainties [8] ." The Þnancial costs of subcontracting include decreased scale economies to the contractor [10] and the transaction costs resulting from the initiation and management of the contracting relationship [19] . Finally, an extensive economics literature discusses our topic when studying vertical integration but that literature generally ignores capacity considerations.
Few papers explicitly study an analytic model of subcontracting. Kamien and Li [14] present a multi-period, game theoretic aggregate planning model with given capacity constraints and show that the option of subcontracting results in production smoothing. Kamien, Li and Samet [15] study Bertrand price competition with subcontracting in a deterministic game with capacity constraints implicit in their convex cost structure. Hanson [11] develops and empirically tests a model of the optimal sharing of the ownership of a given, exogenously determined number of units of an asset between a manufacturer and a subcontractor. Tournas [20] captures asymmetries in inhouse information in a principal-agent model and compares them with the bargaining cost of a captive outside contractor. Brown and Lee [5] propose a ßexible reservation agreement in which a manufacturer may reserve supplier capacity in the form of options. Finally, there is signiÞcant literature on outsourcing in supply-chains. Cachon and Lariviere [6] give an overview of various contract types, which will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.
Our model is different in that the capacity investment levels of both the manufacturer and the subcontractor are decision variables. Our multi-variate, multi-dimensional competitive newsvendor formulation is an extension of univariate, one-dimensional supply models and of the univariate competitive newsvendor models of Li [17] and Lippman and McCardle [18] . The multi-variate demand distribution allows us to investigate the important role of market demand correlation and provides a graphical interpretation of the solution. Our multi-dimensional model allows us to study the impact of subcontracting on both players' in-house investment levels and on the buyer's outsourcing decision, which is pre-assumed in captive-buyer captive-supplier models. We show that the higher complexity of subcontracting (two capacity decisions) makes coordination more difficult compared to traditional outsourcing models (only supplier capacity) in supply chains; we explicitly distinguish coordination of ex-ante investment decisions from ex-post production and sales decisions coordination. Finally, we have chosen to make both models essentially single-period and to posit no information asymmetries between the two parties. Therefore we shall not discuss how subcontracting can smooth production plans over time, create or mitigate information asymmetry problems, or affect the long-run competitive position of the Þrms.
A Subcontracting Model

The Model
Consider a two-stage stochastic model of the investment decision process of two Þrms. In stage one market demands are uncertain and both Þrms must decide separately, yet simultaneously, on their capacity investment levels. At the beginning of stage two, market demands are observed and both Þrms must decide on their production levels to satisfy optimally market demands, constrained by their earlier investment decisions. At this stage, both Þrms have the option to engage in a trade. The subcontractor S can supply the manufacturer M a transfer quantity x t ≥ 0 in exchange for a payment p t x t , as shown in Figure 1 . Before we explain the speciÞcs of the supply contract in the next section, let us discuss model features, notation and two reference scenarios that are useful in evaluating the impact of subcontracting on Þrm performance.
In the Þrst reference scenario both Þrms operate completely independent of each other and subcontracting is not an option (i.e., transfer quantity x t = 0). Both Þrms go solo and each will sell to its own market. For simplicity, we will assume that both Þrms have exclusive access to their respective markets. Because the subcontractor lacks the assembly, marketing and sales clout of the manufacturer, she does not have direct access to market M. In practice, however, the manufacturer may have access to market S through wholly owned upstream subsidiaries that provide them and
others with parts or subsystems. General Motors, for example, owns Delphi Automotives that supplies GM and other auto assemblers with brake systems and other parts. At the same time, GM multisources some parts from outside, independent subcontractors. Thus, market M would represent the end market for cars and market S the intermediate market for parts. GM could compete in market S but we will abstract from such competition to highlight the subcontracting option. Also, notice that direct sourcing from market S instead of from the subcontractor is not an option for the manufacturer. This modeling assumption reßects the relationship-speciÞc information typically present in subcontracting and it implies that we are not discussing the purchase of standardized, off-the-shelf products in commodity markets. The second reference scenario represents the other extreme in which both Þrms are integrated and controlled by a single decision maker. In this centralized scenario the integrated Þrm will serve both markets. Subcontracting, then, is the intermediate scenario in which both Þrms are independently owned so that we have two decision makers, yet trading is possible. (Thus the subcontractor's technology is sufficiently ßexible that it can produce the same product as the manufacturer's technology.)
Let K i ≥ 0 denote Þrm i's capacity investment level, where i = M or S. Firm i is assumed to face a constant marginal investment cost c i > 0, so that its capacity investment cost c i K i is linear in the investment level. Production levels x M and x S + x t are linearly constrained by the capacity investment levels: x M ≤ K M and x S + x t ≤ K S . For simplicity, we assume that both Þrms make constant contribution margins p i per unit sold in market i. Stronger, we will assume zero marginal production costs so that p i represents the Þxed sales price in market i. To avoid trivial solutions we assume that c i < p i . Let D i ≥ 0 denote the product demand in market i. Like Kamien and Li [14] , we assume symmetric information in the sense that each Þrm has complete information about the other's cost and proÞt structure and investment level, and they share identical beliefs regarding future market demands. These beliefs can then be represented by a single, multi-variate probability measure P . For simplicity, we assume that market demands are Þnite with probability one and that P has a continuous density f on the sample space R 2 + . The expectation operator will be denoted by E. We assume zero shortage costs and zero salvage values for both products and production assets 1 . Finally, both Þrms are assumed to be expected proÞt maximizers and the research question can thus be formulated in the two reference scenarios as follows.
Figure 2: Production decisions and total market supply vector X, represented by arrows, depend on the demand D realization and the scenario.
When both Þrms "go solo" the marginal vector is
Because contribution margins exceed investment costs (p i > c i ) both Þrms will invest (ν solo = 0) and the optimality equations directly yield the familiar newsvendor solutions.
Centralization
When both Þrms are controlled by one central decision maker, the optimal production and sales vector x in stage two maximizes system operating proÞt, subject to system capacity and demand constraints. Transfers x t are possible and optimal activity levels x cen and proÞt π cen are the solution of the product mix linear program:
The optimal investment vector K cen maximizes expected system value:
The option of transfers x t enlarges the supply system's capacity region to Ω 0 ∪ Ω 1 , or Ω 01 in short. Using this shorthand notation, if D ∈ Ω 23456 , demand exceeds supply and the optimal supply vector X = (x M + x t , x S ) will be on the boundary of the capacity region Ω 01 . The linear program (2) can be solved parametrically in terms of K and D (thereby directly manifesting the domains Ω l deÞned earlier). If market M yields higher margins than market S, it gets priority in the capacity allocation decision yielding market supply vector X b in Figure 2 . Otherwise market S gets priority yielding vector X a in Figure 2 . As before, π cen (K, D) is concave and the shadow vector λ(K, D) is constant in each domain so that the optimal capacity vector K cen solves Λ cenP (K cen ) = c − ν cen and K cen0 ν cen = 0, where
If M-capacity is less expensive than S-capacity (c M < c S ), it is proÞtable to invest in both types of capacity (ν cen = 0). Otherwise, it is optimal to supply both markets using only the cheaper S-capacity: ν cen M > 0 and K cen M = 0. In the Appendix of [23] we show that V cen is strict concave at K cen so that the optimal investment vector is unique.
We now have completely characterized the optimal investment strategies in both reference scenarios. Clearly, system values under centralization V cen (weakly) dominate those when both players go solo:
. The value gap ∆V solo = V cen − V solo + captures the costs of decentralization. In the remainder of this article, we will investigate how subcontracting can decrease the value gap and whether it can "coordinate" the supply network (that is, eliminate the value gap).
Subcontracting with Price-Only Contracts
A price-only contract speciÞes ex-ante to both parties the transfer (or "wholesale") price p t that the manufacturer must pay for each unit supplied by the subcontractor. Because this simple contract does not specify a transfer quantity x t or any other model variables, it cannot force a party to enter the subcontracting relationship. Using Cachon and Lariviere's [6] terminology, contract compliance is voluntary and both parties will enter the subcontracting relationship (or "trade") only if it beneÞts them. As before, both players must decide separately, yet simultaneously, on their capacity investments in stage 1 before uncertainty is resolved. The resulting capacity vector K is observable and becomes common information. After demand is observed, both parties make their individual production-sales decisions x in stage 2 where they have the option to subcontract. The manufacturer M can ask a supply x M t from the subcontractor S, who has the option to Þll the request. That is, she offers a quantity x S t ≤ x M t , which is accepted by M in exchange for a payment p t x t .
When making decisions, each player acts strategically and takes into account the other player's decisions. Any capacity vector K (or production vector x) with the property that no player can increase Þrm value by deviating unilaterally from K (or x) is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and is called simply an optimal investment (production) vector. Its resulting Þrm value (proÞt) vector is denoted by V (K) (or π(x)). The analysis of our subcontracting model involves establishing and characterizing the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this two-player, two-stage stochastic game.
The Production-Subcontracting Subgame
As with any dynamic decision model, we start with stage 2 and solve the production-subcontracting subgame for any given pair (K, D). Both players decide sequentially on their production and transfer levels in order to maximize their own operating proÞt:
and
Incentives to subcontract depend on the transfer price p t . First, M will only subcontract if p t < p M , otherwise the independent solo solution emerges. Thus, for the remainder of this article we will assume p t < p M so that M will always prioritize his internal capacity and will ask S to Þll the remaining demand:
Second, S has an incentive to Þll M's demand if p t > p S , while she will prefer to Þll her own market demand if p t < p S . Thus, we must distinguish between two cases:
1. High transfer price: p S < p t < p M . S prefers Þlling M's request to the best of her capacity:
, which materializes whenever M has excess demand, that is if D ∈ Ω 13456 . S will use any remaining capacity to Þll her own market demand:
(The resulting market supply vector in Figure  2 is X b .) 2. Low transfer price: p t ≤ min(p). S prefers serving her own market:
, and subcontracting will materialize when M has excess market demand and S has low market demand, that is if D ∈ Ω 156 . (The resulting market supply vector in Figure 2 is X a .)
In both cases, the production vector x(K, D) forms a unique Nash equilibrium because no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally. At any transition point between the two cases (e.g., p S = p t ), players are indifferent because they receive the same proÞt in either case, and a continuum of production vectors are Nash equilibria. This poses no problems, however, because
The intersection of the capacity reaction curves k M (bold) and k S (dashed bold) deÞnes the optimal investment K sub when subcontracting with low p t (left) and high p t (right).
linear programming theory yields that the associated proÞt vector π(K, D) is unique and concave in K, which is all we need to solve the investment game in stage 1.
The Capacity Investment Game
To demonstrate the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure investment strategies, we will show that the capacity reaction curves have a stable intersection point. Firm i's capacity reaction curve k i (·) speciÞes its optimal investment level 
Firm i 0 s reaction curve is found by solving FOC i as a function of K j . The Appendix of [23] shows that −1 ≤ dk i dK j ≤ 0 and that axis crossings and asymptotes are as shown in Figure 3 . Thus, the reaction curves have an intersection K sub at which at least one reaction curve has a slope
Hence, K sub is unique and stable (Nash).
Production versus Investment Coordination
Subcontracting with price-only contracts can coordinate production decisions if
only then is the contingent production vector under subcontracting x(K, D) equal to the production x cen (K, D) in the centralized scenario. (Incentive incompatibilities arise if p t < p S < p M and D ∈ Ω 3456 : under subcontracting the supplier will prioritize its own market whereas the centralized system would prioritize market M.) This contract arrangement, however, cannot coordinate ex-ante capacity investment decisions or eliminate all decentralization costs as measured by the value gap ∆V = V cen − V sub + . Mathematically, the optimal centralized and subcontracting investment vectors in general differ as the unique solutions to Λ cenP (K cen ) = c−ν cen and Λ subP (K sub ) = c − ν sub , respectively, with Λ cen 6 = Λ sub . Hence, V sub + < V cen because the value functions are strictly concave at the optimal investment vectors. Economically, our singleparameter price-only contract is unable to provide sufficient ex-ante incentives for both players to 'build' K sub = K cen . As in most realistic multi-player models, the Þrst-best solution is not attained and decentralization comes at a cost.
These contracts do, however, mitigate decentralization costs and improve performance. Comparing the capacity reaction curves with the optimality curves that deÞne the optimal centralized and solo investment (the thin lines in Figure 3 ) directly shows that subcontracting drives investment towards the centralized investment K cen :
This is what one expects: subcontracting allows the manufacturer to decrease his investment. The option of subcontracting means potentially more business for the supplier and thus warrants additional 'relationship-speciÞc' investment. Next, we investigate how other model primitives impact the coordination improvement.
Sensitivity of the Investment-Subcontracting Strategies
The sensitivity of the optimal investment strategy with respect to changes in capacity costs c, contribution margins p, and transfer price p t is summarized in Table 1 . As expected, optimal manufacturing and supplier capacity levels are imperfect substitutes with respect to capacity costs c and margins p. Indeed, strategic decision making captured by our game-theoretic model makes one party's investment level and Þrm value dependent on the other party's cost and revenue structure. When the manufacturer faces higher investment costs, for example, he will decrease his investment level. The supplier anticipates that lower manufacturing capacity most likely will lead to higher supply requests x M t . This gives the supplier an incentive to increase her investment, reßecting the externalities in our model. The increase in K sub S , however, does not make up for the decrease in K sub M (because transfers are only made with a probability strictly less than one). A similar reasoning applies to a change in margin p, but it has a smaller impact than a cost change simply because the margin dependency is state-dependent. For example, an increase in p M only warrants an increase in manufacturing capacity if demand is sufficiently large (e.g., D ∈ Ω 45 if p t > p S ). An increase in c M , on the other hand, always justiÞes a decrease in manufacturing capacity, regardless of the demand realization. This result is in stark contrast to deterministic systems and one expects this sensitivity differential to increase in the amount of demand variability. Figure 4 : Capacity levels, the option value of subcontracting V option and the decreased value gap ∆V as a function of the transfer price p t when market demands are uniform but strongly negatively correlated.
More interestingly, while the supplier's value sensitivity directly reßects the externalities in the model, the manufacturer's value is a little more intricate. Clearly, an increase in supplier costs leads to a decrease in total system capacity, which impacts both parties' value negatively. An increase in manufacturing cost beneÞts the supplier who increases her capacity in anticipation of a larger total demand x M t + D S . Recall that the centralized system would put all capacity with the supplier if c M > c S . Hence, anything that shifts capacity from the manufacturer to the supplier will tend to beneÞt the system. (The structure of the capacity reaction curves shows that K sub moves toward K cen -and thus V sub + moves toward V cen -if c M increases, even if c M ≤ c S .) This effect can dominate to yield the unexpected result that the manufacturer's value can be increasing in its investment cost. The manufacturer enjoys spill-over beneÞts from increased supplier capacity that may outweigh his increased investment costs.
Similar effects can occur when increasing the transfer price. The table shows that this has a similar effect as a simultaneous increase in margins p M and p S . The absolute effect on investment levels and Þrm values is ambiguous. An increase in p t makes subcontracting more expensive for the manufacturer relative to internal capacity investment. This is reßected by a rightward move of the manufacturer's reaction curve k M in Figure 3 . Increased transfer prices, however, give the supplier a higher incentive to increase her "relationship-speciÞc" investment. Thus, while we expect K sub M to decrease and K sub S to increase, the supplier's reaction curve k S can move upward more than k M moves right so that K sub M increases and K sub S decreases. Figure 4 illustrates the intricate externalities that can occur in stochastic games. Contract design, or the choice of the optimal p t , thus becomes very case speciÞc and depends on the objective. (One can maximize manufacturer, supplier or system proÞts, or some combination, depending on how the transfer price is set. It may be the outcome of negotiation between the two partners, or it may be equal to an external reference price if another external supply market exists.) In all our numerical test problems, system proÞts were maximized at p t = p S yielding a substantial improvement in the value gap ∆V , which is in agreement with economic theory stating that transfer prices should be set equal to outside opportunity costs. If the manufacturer sets the transfer price, however, he does not necessarily set it at p S . Indeed, because of demand variability, a transfer price below p S may yield optimal proÞts for the manufacturer. Figure 4 illustrates this possibility when market demands are strongly negatively correlated (ρ = −0.9). As argued earlier, the capacity levels are imperfect substitutes while Table 1 shows that total industry investment level K sub + is increasing in p t . The Þgure also shows that in the context of our model subcontracting may reduce or increase industry investment compared to the solo or centralized setting. (While the Þgure shows that K solo + < K sub + , this is not true in general either.) Interestingly, similar to the c M dependence described earlier, a higher transfer price may increase the manufacturer's proÞt. This suggests that a price-focused strategy for managing subcontractors can backÞre on the manufacturer. While a lower price allows cheap supply, it does not guarantee its availability.
Finally, to study the effect of uncertainty on the optimal investment strategies, we consider a probability measure P (· | γ) with density f(· | γ) that is parameterized by an uncertainty measure γ such as an element of the mean demand vector or correlation matrix. Formally, the impact of changes in γ on the optimal investment strategy can be expressed as:
where J is the Jacobian of the optimality equations Λ subP (K sub ) = c − ν sub and
Although this expression is of limited practical value, it may be useful for estimating the sign of ∂ ∂γ K sub . The appendix of [23] shows that J 22 ≤ J 21 ≤ 0 and J 11 ≤ J 12 ≤ 0. Thus,
may have opposite signs so that the optimal manufacturer and supplier investment levels would respond in opposite ways to changes in the demand distribution, akin to the substitution effect stated earlier. This effect is present for changes in the standard deviation or correlation of market demands in the example shown in Figure 5 . For simplicity, we assumed identical mean and standard deviations 2 for D M and D S .
As shown in the left graphs of Figure 5 , optimal investment levels are monotone in variability as measured by the standard deviation, but they can be increasing or decreasing. This is similar to the well-known effect in one-dimensional newsvendor models with symmetric demand distributions where optimal investment increases (decreases) in variability if the critical ratio c p > 0.5 (< 0.5). More importantly, compared to the independent "solo" setting, an increase in market risk decreases the manufacturer's relative investment if there is a subcontracting option. This can be paraphrased by saying that the manufacturer will subcontract more as market risk increases and the subcontractor's response is to invest more 3 . The presence of demand uncertainty is a key driver in the option value of subcontracting, which is increasing in variability. Thus, similar to many Þnancial options, more uncertainty is good for this real option. In absolute terms, however, more variability reduces Þrm values. The graph at the right in Figure 5 shows that the manufacturer will subcontract less as market correlation increases. Indeed, when market demands are positively correlated, the subcontracting option has less value so that the optimal fraction of capacity that is subcontracted decreases. In terms of our graphical solution technique of Figure 2 , the triangular option region Ω 1 gets more probability mass as correlation becomes more negative. 
Outsourcing or Complete Subcontracting:
The structure of the capacity reaction curves shows that the optimal investment strategy has one of two distinct forms: either both Þrms invest or only the supplier invests. In the latter case, the manufacturer relies for all sourcing on the outside party. One can express an outsourcing condition in terms of a thresholdc M on the manufacturer's investment cost c M as follows. SetK = (0, k S (0)) and deÞne the threshold costc M = Λ sub 1·P (K), where Λ sub 1· is the Þrst row of Λ sub . Then the manufacturer should outsource if and only if his investment cost c M exceeds the threshold costc M .
Coordination of investment decisions would require thatc M = c S , because the centralized system puts all capacity at the supplier if c M > c S . Under price-only subcontracting, however, the threshold costc M depends not only on c S , but also on the margins p, the "cost to subcontract" as expressed by the transfer price p t , and the joint demand distribution P . Figure 6 illustrates that the 'outsourcing zone' of the strategy space is smaller than the outsourcing zone under centralization (c M ≥ c S ). This conÞrms that subcontracting with simple price contracts improves system performance as compared to the solo scenario (never outsourcing), yet it cannot eliminate the value gap ∆V in general. In the Appendix of [23] we show that for low levels of demand uncertainty, the threshold level is independent of the demand distribution and
Thus,c M > c S and with little demand uncertainty (σ ≤ σ * ) and low transfer prices, no outsourcing will happen. Indeed, in this case M must still invest in in-house capacity because of two effects, both related to the low transfer price and low uncertainty. First, M cannot induce the supplier to Þll his requests: with p t < (c S <)p S , S will prioritize her own market. Second, little uncertainty and low transfer prices p t < c S give the supplier insufficient incentive to invest in extra capacity to serve the manufacturer. For transfer prices higher than the supplier's capacity cost, outsourcing is possible because S now has an incentive to build extra capacity (p t > c S ). For medium transfer prices, the thresholdc M is decreasing in p t so that outsourcing becomes more likely with higher transfer prices p t , reßecting a higher incentive for S. When the transfer price exceeds the supplier's margin, a discontinuous drop inc M makes outsourcing even more likely: p t > p S ensures M that its requests will now get priority by S. As the transfer price increases, however, subcontracting increasingly becomes more expensive for the manufacturer compared to in-house capacity so that M has less incentive to outsource. When the level of demand uncertainty rises above a certain level (σ > σ * ), the threshold costc M will decrease for low to medium transfer prices (p t < p S ) but increase for high transfer prices (p S < p t < p M ). Thus, for low to medium transfer prices, more uncertainty makes higher manufacturing requests more likely, creating a stronger incentive for the supplier to invest in extra capacity, which makes outsourcing more likely. For high transfer prices, on the other hand, more uncertainty increases the expected total transfer cost to the manufacturer who will prefer more in-house capacity, making outsourcing less likely.
Subcontracting with Other Contracts
Incomplete Contracts: Bargaining
In some situations, ex-ante contracts may be too expensive or impossible to specify or enforce. Start-up companies and companies in developing countries may Þnd it too expensive to enforce execution of a contract [11] , while investments by suppliers in quality, information sharing systems, responsiveness and innovation are often non-contractible. "Without the ability to specify contractually in advance the division of surplus from non-contractible investments, this surplus will be divided based on the ex-post bargaining power of the parties involved [3] ." This incomplete contracts approach was Þrst suggested by Grossman, Hart and Moore [9, 13] to study vertical integration. The negotiation on the surplus division can be cast as bilateral bargaining. Many bargaining games are possible (c.f. Kamien and Li [14, p. 1357] ). Nash introduced a game that leads to splitting the surplus evenly. Rubinstein presents a sequential game in which player i gets fraction θ = 1−δ i 1−δ i δ j of the surplus, where δ i is the "impatience" or discount factor of player i, which is ex-ante observable. Whichever bilateral bargaining game is used, the manufacturer can ex-ante expect (but not contractually specify) to receive fraction θ of the surplus while the supplier will get fractionθ = 1 − θ. One can also think of θ as the 'bargaining power' of the manufacturer.
The analysis is similar to before in that both Þrms have the option to engage in a trade at the beginning of stage two. The Þrms can decide jointly on production-sales decisions so that the resulting activity vector equals the vector chosen in the centralized scenario. Engaging in subcontracting thus yields a proÞt surplus ∆π(
, and both parties thus have an incentive to implement the centralized production vector x cen (K, D) by engaging in the trade x t (K, D). Hence, production decisions are always coordinated with incomplete contracts (in contrast to price-only contracts where poor production decisions can occur if p t < p S < p M ).
Investment coordination, however, is not achieved. Indeed, the manufacturer's operating proÞt is π solo M + θ∆π while the supplier's is π solo S +θ∆π. Because ∂ ∂K j6 =i π solo i = 0, the capacity reaction curves can be constructed again in terms of a shadow matrix:
Both curves have a unique, stable intersection that deÞnes the optimal investment vector K bar that in general differs from K cen because Λ bar 6 = Λ cen . Thus, the division of the ex-post surplus gives the supplier an incentive to make a relationship-speciÞc investment, yet insufficient 4 to implement K cen . As shown in Figure 7 , reduction in the value gap ∆V and the option value of subcontracting with incomplete contracts is maximal when surplus is divided not too unevenly (but it need not be a fair 50 − 50 split). More importantly, incomplete contracts are not inferior to explicit price-only contracts. For example, comparing Figure 7 with corresponding Figures 4 and 6 shows that the option value can be larger and that outsourcing is more likely. The higher option value may reßect the fact that with incomplete contracts production coordination is always achieved. It also suggests that sometimes Þrms may be better off leaving some contract parameters unspeciÞed ex-ante and agreeing to negotiate after demand is observed. Let us highlight the role of the bargaining power θ, because the sensitivity of the investment strategy to other parameters is similar to that under price-only contracts. As earlier, we can express an outsourcing condition in terms of a thresholdc M on the manufacturer's investment cost c M . The appendix of [23] derives the following bounds on the outsourcing threshold:
The threshold is decreasing (almost linearly) for small θ, which implies that outsourcing is more likely for more powerful manufacturers. The argument, however, cannot be generalized to very powerful manufacturers (θ → 1): the threshold may be increasing near θ = 1 as shown in Figure  7 . Indeed, if θ is near 1, outsourcing is less likely because the subcontractor receives less ex-post surplus and has less ex-ante incentive to make a relation-speciÞc investment. Similarly, if bargaining power is very small, most surplus goes to the supplier. As with price-only contracts, c M 6 = c S , and the outsourcing zone under this contract is again smaller than the zone under centralization: mere supplier cost advantage of the subcontractor is not sufficient for the manufacturer to outsource because the surplus division incentive is insufficient for the subcontractor to implement the centralized capacity level.
State-dependent Price-Only Contracts
A state-dependent price-only contract speciÞes an ex-ante transfer price p t (K, D) for each possible contingent state vector. (Such a contract requires that capacity levels are not only observable by the two Þrms as assumed earlier, but also veriÞable by a third party.) Not only can these contracts improve performance because of their increased degrees of freedom, optimal state-dependent priceonly contract design can coordinate investment decisions and eliminate all decentralization costs. Indeed, it is directly veriÞed that the sufficient condition
. Such a contract achieves investment coordination (and production coordination because p t ≤ p M ≤ p S ) by aligning incentives: subcontracting is costless in Ω 1 (equal to S's marginal opportunity cost when going solo) giving M the correct incentive to reduce its investment to K cen M and rely on subcontracting, while a transfer price in Ω 56 equal to M's marginal opportunity proÞt p M gives S the right incentive to increase its investment to K cen S . Similarly, if p S ≤ p M coordination calls for p t = 0 in Ω 1 , p t = p S in Ω 36 and p t = p M in Ω 45 . Higher incentives are now necessary for S to prioritize market M above its own market (as the centralized system would do): transfer prices must at least equal its own margin in Ω 36 and be higher in Ω 45 to induce production and investment coordination.
It is surprising that our model setup allows us to characterize these necessary and sufficient conditions for coordination this easily. In addition, notice that these sufficient state-dependent contracts are actually simpler than their name suggests: one only must specify the transfer prices under six scenarios Ω i in our model and not for each state D.
State-dependent price-only contracts can be related to incomplete contracts as follows. The execution of the inter-Þrm transfer x bar t (K bar , D) and the surplus division is implemented by specifying the quantity x t (K, D) to be provided by the subcontractor and the unit transfer price p bar t to be paid by the manufacturer. This transfer price is deÞned implicitly in the bargaining model in that it guarantees the correct division of surplus: π bar S = p S x cen S + p bar t x cen t (recall that x bar = x cen and x cen M = x solo M ) and rearranging terms yields
This transfer payment p bar t x cen t is the composition of two terms:
is the gross surplus derived from subcontracting while p S (x solo S − x cen S ) is the subcontractor's opportunity cost or the proÞt forgone by subcontracting. The gross surplus is received by the manufacturer who pays the sharē θp M x cen t to the subcontractor. The subcontractor bears the opportunity cost and is compensated by the manufacturer for the share θp S (x solo S − x cen S ). Solving (6) in each domain Ω i yields the state-dependent transfer prices: If p M < p S , p bar t = θp M in Ω 156 (its value in Ω 0234 is irrelevant because no transfer occurs then). This p bar t (K, D) contract yields production coordination because p bar t =θp M ≤ p M < p S . Thus, if p M < p S , this state-dependent price-only contract is equivalent to the incomplete contract with parameter θ: it implements identical centralized production decisions and the particular choice of p t (K, D) guarantees that expected operating proÞts equal those under the bargaining model and hence their investment vectors are identical. If p M > p S , however, the existence of an equivalent statedependent price-only contract is not guaranteed in general. Solving (6) yields p bar
In general, such a price-only contract does not guarantee production coordination. If, however, M has limited bargaining power so thatθp M ≥ p S , then p S ≤ p t (K, D) ≤ p M and production coordination is guaranteed so that the p t contract yields the same investment vector as the incomplete contract.
State-dependent Incomplete Contracts
A state-dependent incomplete contract is an incomplete contract with state-dependent surplus division (bargaining) parameter θ(K, D). Given their equivalence with state-dependent price-only contracts if supplier margins are higher (p S ≥ p M ), it is not surprising that these contracts also coordinate the supply system. Indeed, if p M ≤ p S , the sufficient condition for investment coordination Λ bar = Λ cen is satisÞed with θ = 1 (M receives all surplus) in Ω 1 , any constant θ in Ω 234 and θ = 0 (S receives all surplus) in Ω 56 . (This θ(K, D) is also found by requiring that the equivalent p bar t is coordinating: p bar t =θp M = 0 in Ω 1 and p bar t =θp M = 1 in Ω 56 .) Similarly, with p M > p S , equality of Λ bar and Λ cen requires θ = 1 in Ω 13 , any constant θ in Ω 2 , θ = 0 in Ω 45 , but no constant θ in Ω 6 exists to equalize Λ bar ·6 and Λ cen ·6 . Hence, we must look for a variable function θ(K, D) over Ω 6 . As before, to achieve investment coordination this θ(K, D) must satisfy the sufficient FOC equality Eλ bar = Eλ cen (= Λ cenP (K)). If θ varies over a domain Ω i , however, the marginal proÞt vector in that domain must be expanded to λ bar,i = Λ bar ·i + (
Hence, the FOC become a system of partial differential equations: with i = 6, θ(K, D) must satisfy
where
Recall that a state-dependent priceonly contract requires p t = p S in Ω 6 to induce investment coordination. Solving p bar t = p S for θ yields
which indeed satisÞes (7). Hence, this incomplete contract with truly state-dependent θ(K, D) coordinates the supply system if p M > p S .
Discussion and Extensions
In addition to the three contracts studied here, many other contract structures can be used to regulate subcontracting by adding more parameters to the contract speciÞcation. Cachon and Lariviere [6] give an overview of more sophisticated contracts used in the literature, which typically also specify some conditions on the transfer quantity x t or on the manufacturer's liability of the supplier's excess capacity. Cachon and Lariviere show that these more advanced contracts can, but do not necessarily, improve system coordination and highlight the role of the information structure and the veriÞability (and thus enforcement) of the players' actions. In the presence of information asymmetries, complex contracts provide for a powerful signaling device that can improve performance. Tsay [21] has shown that some price-quantity contracts also improve system coordination. While we analyzed only simple contracts, we believe that many of the characteristics of more complex outsourcing contracts will carry over to our subcontracting model. Other extensions such as the inclusion of speciÞc transaction costs and merging costs are relatively straightforward. We have assumed that the initiation and management of the subcontracting relationship was costless. A positive cost is directly incorporated so that both parties would enter into the relationship only if the ex-post surplus exceeds the transaction cost. Similarly, one can include merging costs, which would explain why both parties do not always choose to merge into a single, centralized organization. Another variation is to make both Þrms more equal 'partners' by dropping the non-negativity constraint on x t to allow for bi-directional transfers. (This also yields a two-location inventory model with transfers between proÞt centers.)
Allowing for demand-dependent sales prices (and thus margins) by incorporating downward sloping demand curves (our Þrms are assumed to be price takers) would yield a duopoly model more in-line with traditional economics. This generalization to incorporate tactical pricing decisions, however, comes at considerable cost. One not only loses the connection to the traditional newsvendor model and its intuitive, graphical interpretation, but the competitive pricing decision under uncertainty greatly increases the complexity of the analysis 5 . Allowing for non-exclusive market access is an easier extension that, we believe, will not change the qualitative insights obtained here. Finally, the time-horizon can be extended to a multi-period setting to study the effect of predictable temporal demand variations, such as over a product life cycle (stochastic temporal variations most likely will lead to a production smoothing effect as studied by Kamien and Li [14] ).
Appendix
All Þrst order conditions (FOC) for optimality are of the form Eλ = ΛP = c,where the 2 × 6 matrix Λ is function only of p t , p M and p S , while the vector P is function only of K (and of parameters in the probability distribution). The structure of the FOCs (or capacity reaction curves) and uniqueness of an optimal solution will be established using partial derivatives which are found by implicitly differentiating one or both FOC. Let x represent a cost or margin parameter of interest. Total differentiation of the FOC yields:
where J is the Jacobian matrix of the FOC:
∂Kj ∂Ki , which can be calculated explicitly:
where the 2 × 6 matrix ∇ K P 0 can be expressed in terms of the line integrals L ij of the probability density f (·) over the boundary between domains Ω i and Ω j and L ij,kl = L ij + L kl :
For example:
invertible which then yields
Thus, letting x = c i we directly have that
and the slope of k i (·), the FOC for K i given K j , follows from totally differentiating the i'th FOC:
Centralized Reference Scenario
The optimal solution K cen is at the intersection of the two FOC curves. We have that
All entries in J are nonpositive with J 11 ≤ J 12 ≤ 0 and J 22 ≤ J 21 ≤ 0 so that |J| ≥ 0 and
Clearly, if c M > c S , it is optimal to invest only in S-capacity: Otherwise, if c M < c S , we invest in both capacities and at least one of the terms in |J| is positive so that V cen is strict concave at the unique optimal K cen . We can compute some points of the centralized curves:
• If K S → ∞ and c M < c S , then P 23456 = 0 so that L 34,56,16 = 0 and Eλ M = 0 < c M so that
a situation that remains if K S decreases as long as P 01 ((0, K S )) = 1. Clearly, this minimal K S increases in correlation and variability.
• If K M = 0, then P 02 = 0 and L 02 = 0. Thus, (
.
• If K M → ∞, then P 13456 = 0 so that L 34,56,16 = 0 and p S P 2 = c S . Thus,
Subcontracting with Price-Only Contracts
The Jacobian becomes
Uniqueness of the solution K sub
Existence of an intersection follows from the relative position of axis crossings and asymptotes:
remains 0 as K S increases with low p t until P 1 becomes positive. Clearly, this maximal K S decreases in correlation and variability.)
a situation that remains if K S decreases as long as P 01 ((k M (∞), K S )) = 1. Clearly, this minimal K S increases in correlation and variability. Note that k M (·) is continuous in p t for p S < p t < p M , except at p t = c M if D M is bounded from below by a positive number with probability one (the demand density is zero at D M = 0).
• If K M = 0, then P 02 = 0 so that L 02 = 0. For high p t we have that p S P 36 + p t P 45 = c S and because p S < p t , we have that
With small variability, we have that
we would have that P 3456 = 1(0), which cannot satisfy FOC S .) For low p t we have that p S P 34 + p t P 56 = c S . If p t < c S , then P 34 > 0. If D has low variability in the sense that P (Ω 1 (K = (0, K solo S ))) = 0, then k 2 (·) is discontinuous at p t = c 2 and we have that
If D has high variability, 0 ≤ dk S (0) dK M ≤ −1.
and dk S (∞) dK M = 0, a situation that remains if K M decreases as long as P 456 ((K M , k S (∞)) = 0. Clearly, this minimal K M increases in variability.
Uniqueness of K sub follows from −1 < dkM dKS at intersection (assume high p t , low p t is similar) • If p M ≥ p t > c M : 0 < P 13645 < 1 and because P is a continuous measure we have that L 23,01 > 0 so that V M is strict concave at the optimal K M and thus the reaction curve k M (·) is unique. Moreover −1 < dk M dK S ≤ 0 (and dk M dK S = 0 if P 45 = 0).
• If p M > c M ≥ p t : 0 < P 45 < 1 so that L 34,56 > 0. Again the reaction curve k M (·) is unique but now, as long as k M > 0:
At the intersection K sub we have that −1 < dkM dKS which shows uniqueness (indeed P 012 = 0 would imply P 3456 = 1, which cannot be a solution to FOC S : p S P 36 + p t P 45 ≥ min(p S , p t ) = p S > c S ).
Similarly for Þrm 2's reaction curves (p S P 236 + p t P 45 = c S ), if follows that
• Because p t > p S > c S : 0 < P 236 , P 45 < 1 and thus 0 < P 01 < 1 and L 02,16 > 0 so that V S is strict concave at the optimal K S and thus the reaction curve k S (·) is unique. Moreover −1 ≤ dk S dK M ≤ 0 (and dk S dK M = −1 if P 2 = 0 and dk S dK M = 0 if P 13456 = 0).
Given that the two reaction curves are unique with −1 ≤ dki dKj ≤ 0, and the relative axis crossings are as given higher together with −1 < dkM dKS at any solution to the FOC, it follows that hey have a unique intersection which is a stable, and thus Nash, equilibrium.
Sensitivity of K sub
The intersection point K is the unique solution to the FOC and it follows from the FOC that one will never invest to cover all demand with probability 1. In other words, if K > 0, then 0 < P 01 < 1 and at least one of the terms in det(J) is positive so that |J| > 0 and J is invertible: (α 1 + α 3 )P 1 − α 2 P 56 −α 1 P 1 + (α 2 + α 4 )P 56¸i f p t < min(p).
While
∂ ∂p t
K cannot be signed in general, we do have that
Sensitivity of V sub
We have that 
Denoting Eλ 1,2 = β 5 ≥ 0 and Eλ 2,1 = −β 6 ≤ 0, we get cannot be signed in general. For price sensitivity consider high transfer prices (the other case is similar but replace the P 45 by P 3456 , P 236 by P 234 , P 136 by P 1 , and P 45 by P 56 ): = 0, the capacity reaction curves can be constructed in terms of our primitive shadow matrices
